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Abstract: Insights from developmental psychology provide a useful perspective from which to understand why young 
people might engage in higher levels of antisocial behavior than adults. They can also be useful in term of highlighting 
which aspects of development result in young people making less mature judgments. Yet despite this extensive body of 
knowledge, there is no psychological or legal definition of maturity that can be applied to legal decision making. Within a 
criminal context, investigations of adolescent immaturity have emphasized cognitive factors, influenced by the informed 
consent model which places a premium on factors such as “knowledge” and “competence”, with an emphasis on cognitive 
functioning (e.g., thinking, reasoning, and understanding). This approach has been criticized for failing to adequately 
illustrate differences between adolescent and adult decision making. This paper reviews the notion of psychological 
maturity and comments on the importance of a broader assessment that includes psychosocial factors in the face of a 
growing trend in many jurisdictions to transfer juvenile offenders to the adult jurisdiction based on the severity of crime 
committed rather than their level of culpability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The development of separate justice systems for young 
people
1
 accused of committing criminal acts is predicated on 
two fundamental assumptions: First, that they are less capa-
ble of mature judgment than adults and are, therefore, con-
sidered less culpable for any offenses they might commit 
and, second, that they are more amenable to treatment than 
adults and thus more likely to benefit from rehabilitation 
efforts (Scott & Grisso, 1997). While these two assumptions 
may seem sufficiently straightforward to facilitate the sys-
tem’s smooth functioning, youth justice would appear to be 
in a state of crisis (see Goldson, 2000; Kemshell, 2008; Pitts, 
2001). According to Yates (2004), political opportunism has 
resulted in the politicization of both youth crime and justice, 
the net result of which has been profoundly distorted and 
conflicting policies that tend “to act on an amalgam of ra-
tionales, oscillating around and beyond the caring ethos of 
social services and the neo-liberal ethos of responsibility and 
punishment” (Muncie & Hughes, 2002, p. 1). Public dis-
course and political rhetoric have demanded retribution, re-
sponsibility, and restorative justice while at the same time 
acknowledging the importance of human rights, the need to 
divert young people away from the criminal justice system, 
and the need for rehabilitation. It would seem, however, that 
social control has become the dominant paradigm in many 
countries (Garland, 2001). The terms “youth” and “risk” 
have become synonymous (Green, Mitchell & Bunton, 
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1 Consistent with the tenor of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989), reference made in this paper to children, young people or juveniles will refer to 
young people under the age of 18 years. 
2000), with references to “problem neighbourhoods”, “in-
civilities”, and “urban violence” increasingly dominant in the 
political and media landscape in response to alleged in-
creases in youth offending (Muncie, 2008).  
 A risk discourse such as that which now exists can un-
dermine social justice and erode human rights, often as a 
function of particular political imperatives (Goldson & Mun-
cie, 2006; Hendrick, 2006). Although the various interna-
tional covenants
2
 introduced over the past two decades pro-
vide a strong foundation for ensuring the rights of young 
people are upheld, there remains a strong possibility in the 
current political climate that individual rights will be subju-
gated in favour of the new culture of control said to exist in 
many western countries (Garland, 2001). For example, while 
Hammarberg (2008) has noted that the “… spirit of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child [is] to avoid crimi-
nalization and to seek family-based or other social alterna-
tives to imprisonment” (p. 193), there is a growing trend in 
many jurisdictions to follow the lead of the US where young 
people are “adultified” (Jacobs, 2001) on the basis of crime 
severity or frequency and referred to the adult system for 
adjudication (Muncie, 2008). What seems to have been lost 
in this trend for more punitive sanctions and the treatment of 
young offenders as adults is an understanding of maturity 
and how this might impact on decisions regarding culpabil-
ity. There is no legal definition of maturity; nor, unfortu-
nately, does a psychological definition exist. Until the 
ground-breaking decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005) which 
abolished the juvenile death penalty in the US, the legal no-
                                                
2 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules); the United 
Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines); 
and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty 
(Havana Rules) 
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tion of maturity focused predominantly on cognitive capabil-
ity (e.g., capacity for thinking, reasoning, and understanding) 
rather than adopting a more holistic view of developmental 
maturity that includes psychosocial and emotional develop-
ment. The aim of this paper is draw together more recent 
findings which illustrate the challenges and need for a more 
comprehensive assessment of culpability and maturity of 
judgment in young people who come before the criminal 
justice system. This is particularly relevant in view of the 
current trend in many jurisdictions to transfer juvenile of-
fenders to the adult system for adjudication.  
BACKGROUND 
 Research in the field of developmental psychology has 
provided a strong body of evidence to explain why young 
people might engage in more antisocial behavior than adults 
and, more particularly, which aspects of development may 
be responsible for young people making less mature judg-
ments (e.g., Cauffman, Piquero, Kimmonis, Steinberg, Chas-
sin & Fagan, 2007; Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Cauffman, 
Steinberg, & Piquero, 2005; Galambos, Macdonald, 
Naphtali, Cohen & Frias, 2004; Lerner & Galambos, 1998; 
Tilton-Weaver, Vitunski, & Galambos, 2001). Based on 
these finding, it is now accepted that young people are more 
impulsive (e.g., Carroll, Hemingway, Bower, Ashman, 
Houghton, & Durkin, 2006; Ramoutar & Farrington, 2005), 
less risk aversive (e.g., Steinberg, 2007), have less developed 
problem solving skills (Antonowicz & Ross, 2005; McMur-
ran, Blair & Egan, 2002), and engage in less consequential 
thinking than their adult counterparts (e.g., Cauffman, Shul-
man, Steinberg, Claus, Banich, Graham, & Woolard, 2010). 
Several key findings are particularly relevant to reversing the 
current trend to reduce the age at which young people can be 
treated as adults. For example, it is now accepted that devel-
opment occurs at different rates for different individuals; that 
rather than being invariant, development is much more fluid 
(i.e., skills and knowledge can accrue unevenly in different 
task areas rather than as a uniform increase in overall capac-
ity); and that differences in language ability, knowledge, 
experience and culture affect the ages at which these various 
competencies emerge for different individuals (Gibbs, Bas-
inger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; Jacobs & Klaczynski, 2002; 
Keating, 1990; Lerner & Galambos, 1998). Thus while the 
law attempts to demarcate adolescence and adulthood, this 
practice is clearly inconsistent with developmental science 
(Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham & Banich, 2009). 
As Steinberg and his colleagues have noted “Drawing age 
boundaries on the basis of developmental research cannot be 
done sensibly without a careful and nuanced consideration of 
the particular demands placed on the individual for ‘adult-
like’ maturity in different domains of functioning.” (p. 583).  
 The importance of assessing multiple domains of matur-
ity was central to the landmark decision handed down by the 
US Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons (2005) which 
served to abolish the juvenile death penalty in that country. 
A 5-to-4 majority ruled in favour of raising the boundary for 
capital punishment from 16 to 18 years. In making their de-
cision, the Supreme Court Justices relied heavily on an 
amicus curiae brief submitted by the American Psychologi-
cal Association (APA, 2004) outlining relevant research into 
psychological development during adolescence (see Stein-
berg et al., 2009). Based in part on this evidence, the Justices 
concluded that as compared to adults, juveniles are less cul-
pable. In particular, it was noted that juveniles are more im-
mature, less blameworthy and less responsible than adults; 
have greater difficulty controlling their impulses; are more 
likely to be influenced by external pressure including peer 
pressure; and are more vulnerable, which can be attributed in 
part to having less control over their environment than do 
adults. Attention was also given to what was perceived as 
differences in character between juveniles and adults: “The 
personality traits of the juvenile are more transitory, less 
fixed” (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, p. 16). An important dis-
tinction made in the Roper case is that while the performance 
of adolescents and adults is comparable on tests of cognitive 
ability (e.g., logical reasoning about moral, social, and inter-
personal matters), they are not equal in terms of their psy-
chosocial capacities (i.e., impulse control, resistance to peer 
influence). The remainder of this paper will review relevant 
developmental research which identifies the cognitive and 
psychosocial capacities that apply to adolescent offenders 
who come before the courts. In so doing, the paper will iden-
tify how differences in the developmental trajectory in these 
domains of impacts upon decision making.  
COGNITIVE ASSESSMENTS OF MATURITY  
 Despite legal presumptions about the inherent immaturity 
of adolescents, the major focus of investigations into adoles-
cent immaturity relies heavily on an assessment of the cogni-
tive domain of functioning. The emphasis in this approach, 
which rests on the consideration of factors such as “knowl-
edge” and “competence”, is very much influenced by the 
informed consent model derived from research investigating 
the capacity of young people to give informed consent for 
medical procedures (see Culver, 1982; Steinberg & Cauff-
man, 1996; Wadlington, 1983). The difficulty with taking a 
strictly cognitive approach is that by late adolescence, differ-
ences between adolescents and adults is most notable for 
those aged 15 years and younger (see Keating, 2004). For 
example, Kail’s (1997) examination of age-related differ-
ences in tests of cognitive processing time, imagery skill, 
and spatial memory span showed that performance typically 
improved more rapidly in childhood than in adolescence. 
Hale (1990) also found that while processing speed changed 
as a function of age, these differences declined over a 5-year 
period in late adolescence: Whereas 10- and 12-year-olds 
were, respectively, 1.8 times and 1.5 times slower than 
young adults, 15-year-olds processed information at the 
same speed as young adults. In fact, Overton’s (1990; 
Chapell & Overton, 1998) research suggests there is little 
systematic growth in the logical abilities relevant to deci-
sion-making after the age of 16.  
 Given findings such as these, a number of researchers 
have examined whether the capacity of adolescents with re-
spect to adjudicative competence actually differs from that of 
adults. While jurisdictions may differ in terms of nomencla-
ture, the assessment of adjudicative competence is typically 
concerned with three primary elements: a basic comprehen-
sion of the purpose and nature of the trial process (i.e., un-
derstanding), the capacity to provide relevant information to 
counsel and to process information (i.e., reasoning), and the 
ability to apply information to one’s own situation in a man-
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ner that is neither distorted nor irrational (i.e., appreciation) 
(see Bonnie, 1992, 1993; Bonnie & Grisso, 2000). Not sur-
prisingly, this body of research has revealed that while there 
is a significant difference in the competence-related abilities 
of adults and adolescents aged 15 years and younger, these 
differences are no longer apparent when comparing the abili-
ties of adults and adolescents aged 16 and older (e.g., Grisso, 
Steinberg,Woolard, Cauffman, & Scott et al., 2003; Jacobs-
Quadrel, Fischhoff, & Davis, 1993; Steinberg et al., 2009; ).  
 Evidence for the absence of a quantitative difference in 
adjudicative competence between adulthood and late adoles-
cence was demonstrated in Grisso et al.’s (2003) comparison 
of adolescents in juvenile detention facilities (N = 453) and 
community settings (N = 474) and young adults in jails (N = 
233) and the community (N = 233) as part of the MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network’s investigation into age dif-
ferences in competence to stand trial. Adjudicative compe-
tence was assessed using the MacArthur Competence As-
sessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA)
3
, a 
well-established instrument used to assess competence-
related legal capacities in adults which has also been used 
with adolescents in the domains of both research (e.g., 
Burnett, Noblin, & Prosser, 2004; LaVelle Ficke, Hart, & 
Deardorff, 2006; Warren, Aaron, Ryan, Chauhan, & DuVal, 
2003) and clinical evaluation (Ryba, Cooper, & Zapf, 2003). 
Findings in the Grisso et al. study revealed significant im-
pairment in juveniles aged 15 and younger to the extent that 
it would compromise their ability to serve as competent de-
fendants in criminal proceedings. In fact, the level of im-
pairments in one third of 11- to 13-year-olds and one-fifth of 
14-15-year olds was comparable to that of seriously mentally 
ill adults who, based on established norms (Otto, Poythress, 
Edens, Nicholson, Monahan, Bonnie, Hoge, & Eisenberg, 
1998; Poythress, Nicholson, Otto, Edens, Bonnie, Monahan, 
& Hoge, 1999) would be considered incompetent to stand 
trial. However, the competence-relevant capacities of 16- 
and 17-year-olds did not differ significantly from those of 
young adults, a pattern found to be robust across groups de-
fined by gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status.  
 In a later study, Poythress, Lexcen, Grisso, and Steinberg 
(2006) compared the competency-relevant abilities of a sam-
ple of 16-17-year-olds youths (N = 105) in the US who had 
been direct filed
4
 to criminal court with those of 18-24-year-
old adults (N = 165) charged in the criminal court and a 
separate sample of 16-17-year-olds (N = 118) charged in 
juvenile court. Consistent with the earlier findings of Grisso 
et al. (2003) described above, very little difference was 
found between the 16-17-year-old defendants transferred to 
criminal court by direct file, 18-24-year-old criminal defen-
dants and 16-17-year-olds charged in juvenile court on the 
M-CAT-CA subscales The only significant difference noted 
was on the Understanding subscale (assessing comprehen-
sion of courtroom procedures and rights at trial), where the 
                                                
3 The 22 MacCAT-CA items are grouped into three subscales: Understanding assesses 
comprehension of courtroom procedures and personnel and the defendant’s rights at 
trial. Reasoning assesses the recognition of information relevant to a legal defense and 
the ability to process information for legal decision making. The Appreciation 
subscale, referring to a person’s ability to recognize the relevance of information for 
one’s own situation, assesses whether a defendant’s legal decision making is influenced 
by symptoms of mental illness, such as delusional thinking. 
4 Direct file refers to the discretion of prosecutors in some US stages to file certain 
types of cases (usually based on offense type and/or prior offending history) in either 
juvenile court or criminal court. 
direct file group performed slightly better than the adult 
sample (although the effect size was small d = .38). Once 
scores were classified according to the M-CAT-CA manual 
as “no impairment,” “mild impairment,” or “significant im-
pairment”, no significant differences were noted on the Un-
derstanding subscale (2(4)=8.65, p>.05). There were sig-
nificant differences in the proportion of individuals who 
were impaired on the Reasoning subscale (2(4)=10.91, p < 
.03) which assesses the extent to which a defendant can dis-
tinguish information relevant to constructing a defense. 
There was a smaller proportion of impaired individuals in 
the direct file group (2%) as compared to those in the juve-
nile (8%) or adult offender groups (8%). The proportion of 
participants who met the criterion of “not impaired” was 
greater for those whose matters were directly filed (90%) 
than in either the juvenile (75%) or adult offender (74%) 
groups. Based on their findings, the authors concluded that 
the 16-17-year-old adolescents whose matters were filed 
directly to the adult legal system for adjudication did not 
differ significantly from 18-24 year old adult criminal defen-
dants in competence-related abilities and developmental 
characteristics that might potentially impact on the decision 
making in the legal process. In explaining the differences in 
impairments levels for the Reasoning subscale, the authors 
offer several explanations (e.g., direct-file offenders commit 
more serious crimes and may therefore be more sophisticated 
in their knowledge of the legal system) although they also 
acknowledge it may simply have been an anomaly in the 
sample. However, even if one accepts this latter explanation, 
what the finding does highlight is the fluid nature of cogni-
tive development and the need for more rigorous assessment.  
 In light of the ruling in Roper (2005) and criticisms 
aimed at the APA on what was seen as its inconsistent stand 
on the psychological maturity of adolescents
5
, Steinberg et 
al. (2009) explored age differences in a variety of cognitive 
and psychosocial capacities deemed relevant to debates 
about the maturity of adolescents and adults, with a particu-
lar focus on how these might affect judgments of criminal 
blameworthiness. Issues of cognitive capacity will be con-
sidered here; the findings with respect to psychosocial ma-
turity will be discussed in the following section. The study 
(The MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study) assessed the cog-
nitive capacity of 935 participants (ranging in age from 10 to 
30 years; M = 17.84) using a range of commonly used tests 
of cognitive skills including a measure of resistance to inter-
ference in working memory, a digit-span memory test, and a 
test of verbal fluency (controlling for IQ). Scores on these 
measures were used to create an index of general cognitive 
capacity.
6
 The analysis of age differences compared five 
                                                
5 In its Supreme Court amicus brief in Roper v. Simmons (2005), which abolished the 
juvenile death penalty, APA described adolescents as developmentally immature. In its 
amicus brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990), which upheld adolescents’ right to seek 
an abortion without parental involvement, APA argued that adolescents are as mature 
as adults. Steinberg et al. (2009) argued that because adolescents demonstrate adult 
levels of cognitive capability earlier than emotional and social maturity it is reasonable 
to assert that adolescents possess the necessary skills to make informed choices about 
terminating pregnancy but are less mature than adults in ways that mitigate criminal 
responsibility 
6 The authors acknowledged that the assessment of cognitive ability used in their study 
did not tap aspects of executive function that may be important in novel situations nor 
tests of higher order executive functioning (e.g., short- versus long-term consequences, 
coordinating affect and cognition, or balancing risk and reward). However, given 
executive functions such as these have both cognitive and psychosocial aspects and 
their aim was to maintain a distinction between general cognitive and psychosocial 
capacities, they considered it important not to conflate the two constructs. 
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groups (10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-21, 22-25, and 26-30 
years) and revealed significant differences only in the first 
part of adolescence. That is, there were significant differ-
ences in general cognitive capacity between each of the first 
four age groups but no age differences after age 16 below. 
By way of comparison, provides a graphical representation 
of participants in each age group who scored at or above the 
mean level of the 26- to 30-year-olds. The findings also re-
vealed a substantial gap between the two measures of matur-
ity (i.e., cognitive and psychosocial) As successfully argued 
in the Roper case, general cognitive capacity reaches an 
adult level long before psychosocial maturation is complete. 
PSYCHOSOCIAL MATURITY 
 Heavy reliance on the assessment of cognitive capacity in 
determining maturity has been strongly criticized for failing 
to adequately illustrate differences between adolescent and 
adult decision making at the expense of non-cognitive, psy-
chosocial variables that influence the decision making proc-
ess; that is, aspects of development and behavior that involve 
personality traits, interpersonal relations, and affective expe-
riences (e.g., Grisso et al., 2003; Scott, Reppucci, & 
Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996; Steinberg et 
al., 2009). The evidence which now exists provides support 
for the proposition that mature judgment is in fact the “prod-
uct of an interaction between cognitive and psychosocial 
factors, with competent decision making potentially under-
mined by deficiencies in either domain” (Steinberg & 
Cauffman, p.251). In other words, having the cognitive skills 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of various courses of action 
will be effectively redundant if the individual is, for exam-
ple, highly impulsive; similarly, the decision making capac-
ity of a responsible and temperate individual will be ineffec-
tive if they lack the necessary cognitive skills or have limited 
access to relevant information. 
 The question, therefore, is how one defines the notion of 
maturity in a way which incorporates both its cognitive ele-
ments and those psychosocial factors with the inherent po-
tential to impact on the decision making process. While a 
number of psychosocial factors might fall under this rubric, 
Steinberg and Cauffman (1996; Cauffman & Steinberg, 
1995, 2000) have argued that the majority fit within one of 
three categories of overarching dispositions: Responsibility 
(healthy autonomy, self-reliance, clarity of identity), Tem-
perance (the ability to limit impulsivity, avoid extremes in 
decision making, and to evaluate situations thoroughly be-
fore acting, which includes seeking the advice of others 
when appropriate) and Perspective (being able to acknowl-
edge the complexity of a situation and frame a specific deci-
sion within a larger context). In conjunction with the cogni-
tive competence to reason abstractly, these three dispositions 
comprise the attributes most often associated with mature 
decision making as found in the literature on adolescent psy-
chological development. An important caveat, however, is 
that when faced with a particular decision, the degree to 
which an individual demonstrates each will depend largely 
on two factors: the nature of the situation and the social con-
text within which the decision is to be made. As Steinberg 
and Cauffman note when cautioning against the formulation 
of a general model of maturity of judgment, an individual 
may act responsibly in some situations but irresponsibly in 
others; be the epitome of temperance under certain condi-
tions but highly impulsive under others; and demonstrate 
perspective in some circumstances but in others, be ex-
tremely short-sighted. Thus responsibility, temperance, and 
perspective are best conceived as dispositions to behave in a 
given way under particular conditions, rather than as fixed 
abilities or competencies that are displayed independent of 
context.  
 In developing their conceptualization of psychological 
maturity, Steinberg and Cauffman (1996; Cauffman & Ste-
inberg, 1995) have argued in favour of the term “judgment” 
rather than “decision making” as the former better encapsu-
lates the mix of cognitive and psychosocial processes in-
volved (i.e., factors that influence decisions) whereas the 
latter is more strongly associated with the cognitive domain 
(and in their framework refers the actual choices made). Ma-
turity of judgment, therefore, is defined as the manner in 
which the “process of decision-making changes with devel-
opment ... and is neither exclusively cognitive nor exclu-
sively psychosocial but a consequence of both sets of influ-
ences (Caufman & Steinberg, 2000, p.743). Cauffman and 
Steinberg first examined the relationship between these hy-
pothesized psychosocial elements of mature judgment and 
subsequent decision making by comparing the responses of 
adolescents (8
th
, 10
th
, and 12
th
 grade students) with two 
groups of young adults (college students aged < 21 and >21) 
on measures of psychosocial maturity and a series of hypo-
thetical decision-making dilemmas about potentially antiso-
cial or risky behavior.
7
 Their findings revealed that as com-
pared to adolescents, socially responsible decision making 
was significantly more common in young adults although 
was not found to increase to any appreciable degree after the 
age of 19. Moreover, given that college students under the 
age of 21 performed in a manner similar to their older coun-
terparts, the researchers concluded that once the develop-
ment occurring in adolescence is complete, maturity of 
judgment stabilizes. Higher levels of responsibility, perspec-
tive, and temperance (i.e., increased psychosocial maturity) 
were shown to be positively associated with more mature 
decision-making, regardless of age. In other words, it is psy-
chosocial maturity rather than chronological age which is 
likely to be a stronger predictor of risky and/or antisocial 
decisions. The authors concluded that unlike cognitive de-
velopment, which appears to peak by mid-adolescence, psy-
chosocial characteristics continue to develop during late ado-
lescence and, furthermore, that these changes are associated 
with a significant decline in antisocial decision-making. 
 There are two important limitations when drawing con-
clusions based on the Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) find-
ings: First, despite the large sample (N = 1000), it was drawn 
from a non-offender population and, second, the use of col-
lege students may have confounded the results. However, 
more recent findings from studies conducted by researchers 
involved in the MacArthur Foundation Research Network’s 
investigation into age differences in competence to stand 
trial do offer support for the importance of psychosocial 
variables in the assessment of maturity. For example, in the 
                                                
7 Antisocial decision-making was assessed using the Youth Decision-Making 
Questionnaire (Ford, Wentzel, Wood, Stevens, & Siesfeld, 1990) which presents a set 
of hypothetical situations that involve choosing between antisocial and socially 
accepted courses of action (e.g., shoplifting versus not shoplifting). For each 
hypothetical situation, participants indicate how they would behave if they were 
confronted with such a dilemma 
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Grisso et al. (2003) study described above, participants also 
completed the MacArthur Judgment Evaluation (MacJEN) 
which examines the potential relationship between immatur-
ity and (a) choices made in the course of adjudication (across 
age groups) and (b) three psychosocial factors, namely, risk 
appraisal (risk recognition, risk likelihood, risk impact), fu-
ture orientation, and resistance to peer influence. The find-
ings revealed that, as compared to those aged 18 to 24, par-
ticipants under the age of 18 were significantly less likely to 
apply relevant information to situations (e.g., assess its im-
pact on future consequences and on others involved) and 
were less likely to process events in a meaningful way. Age 
was also significantly related to the choices made in two of 
three legal contexts presented
8
. Irrespective of IQ, the pro-
portion of participants who opted for confession as the best 
choice decreased as age increased as did the proportion ac-
cepting a plea agreement, decreasing from 74% among 11- 
to 13-year-olds to 50% of young adults. Participants aged 15 
and younger were significantly more likely to choose options 
that represented compliance with authorities in all three legal 
contexts.  
 With respect to the other psychosocial variables under 
investigation in the study, in all three legal contexts the 
younger adolescents (11-13 year olds) recognized risks sig-
nificantly less often, while those aged under 14 were more 
likely to report that risks would be serious if they occurred. 
Young adults, on the other hand, reported a significantly 
higher likelihood of risk in each of the situations. In terms of 
providing long-range future consequences in explaining 
choices, perhaps not unsurprisingly, those aged 14 and under 
did this significantly less often. Finally, the relationship be-
tween age and peer influence was found to vary depending 
on the nature of the participant’s original choice. For exam-
ple, in the police interrogation vignette, resistance to peer 
pressure was stronger for those who initially indicated they 
would confess as compared to those stated they would deny 
or remain silent (young adults were more likely to change 
their minds and remain silent than younger participants, who 
were more likely to resist peer influence and confess any-
way). By contrast, resistance increased with age for those 
who originally stated they would remain silent. For the law-
yer consultation vignette, only the original choice predicted 
resistance to peer influence, with participants who reported 
they would not fully disclose information significantly less 
likely to resist peer influence than those who stated they 
would fully disclose. Similarly, original vignette choice pre-
dicted resistance to peer influence in the plea agreement vi-
gnette: greater resistance to peer pressure was found for par-
ticipants who reported they would accept the plea agreement. 
According to Grisso et al. (2003), their findings offer sup-
port for the claim that psychosocial immaturity has the po-
tential to negatively impact how a young defendant performs 
in a way that is beyond the scope of any assessment of 
competency to stand trial. Moreover, their findings are 
consistent with those of the US Supreme Court in Roper with 
respect to psychosocial immaturity in adolescents; that is, the 
tendency for adolescents to be less risk aversive, exercise 
                                                
8 The vignettes in the MacJEN pose three legal decisions common in the 
delinquency/criminal process: (a) responding to police interrogation, (b) disclosing 
information during consultation with a defense attorney (one half of the participants 
were administered a vignette about a public defender and one half a vignette about a 
privately retained attorney); and (c) responding to a plea agreement for reduced 
consequences in exchange for a guilty plea and testimony against other defendants. 
for adolescents to be less risk aversive, exercise poor im-
pulse control, and be less resistance to peer influence.  
 The findings from the Poythress et al. (2006) study illus-
trate not only age-related differences in psychosocial devel-
opment but also the importance of context (see Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 1995, 2000; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). For 
example, while the three types of defendants (direct file, 
juvenile court, and adult court) did not differ in their deci-
sion-making responses to either the police interrogation vi-
gnette or consultation with a public defender, the juvenile 
group was less likely to recommend full disclosure to a pri-
vate attorney and more likely to recommend only partial 
disclosure (a situation which may not be in their best inter-
ests). Participants in the direct file group were also more 
likely to accept a plea bargain, a finding that may reflect the 
nature of the group (i.e., offenses deemed sufficiently serious 
by the prosecution to warrant transfer to the adult court) 
rather than maturity of judgment. Age- and context-related 
differences are also evident when considering comparisons 
on the MacJEN subscales, which revealed significant be-
tween group differences on perceptions of risk likelihood 
and resistance to peer influence. Those in the adult offender 
group were significantly more likely to score higher on the 
measure of risk likelihood (reflecting an understanding of the 
severity of the situation) than either the juvenile or direct file 
group. Although not significantly different (p=.10), scores 
for the direct file group were higher than the juvenile court 
group and the effect size (d = .30) was comparable to that 
found for adult comparisons. In other words, the influence of 
context (being transferred to adult court) was more apparent 
in the assessment of risk for direct file participants as com-
pared to their juvenile court peers. This would seem to re-
flect the nature of the crimes involved (i.e., higher severity 
cases are direct-filed) with the potential for more severe pen-
alties perhaps leading to greater maturity in judgment. Simi-
larly, that resistance to peer influence was significantly 
higher for the direct file group than either the adult or juve-
nile court groups also suggests a situational influence. Fol-
low-up analyses revealed that a larger proportion of the di-
rect file group retained their original choice in the attorney 
consultation (68.7%) and the plea agreement vignette 
(72.5%) as compared to both the adult (54.4% and 59.6%) 
and juvenile court groups (52.2% and 57.8%).  
 Finally, Steinberg et al.’s (2009) analysis of age-related 
differences in psychosocial development demonstrates that 
adolescents display adult levels of cognitive capability at a 
much earlier stage of development than either emotional or 
social maturity. The test battery used in this study included 
measures of five capacities frequently mentioned in discus-
sions about age differences in maturity and their relevance to 
legal policy: risk perception, sensation seeking, impulsivity 
(motor impulsivity, inability to delay gratification, and lack 
of perseverance), resistance to peer influence, and future 
orientation. Scores on the various measures were used to 
produce a composite score of maturity, with lower scores 
indicating a lesser level of maturity. According to the 
authors, individuals scoring relatively lower on the compos-
ite measure can be characterized as less likely to perceive 
dangerous situations as risky, be more impulsive, more thrill 
seeking, more oriented to the immediate, and more suscepti-
ble to peer influence, a description which reflects that used 
by Justice Kennedy in his majority opinion in the Roper. 
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Age-related differences in psychosocial maturity did not 
emerge until mid-adolescence and, moreover, were present 
throughout late adolescence and into early adulthood. In fact, 
whereas no significant differences were found between the 
first four age groups (10-11, 12-13, 14-15, and 16-17 years), 
significant differences were noted between the 16-17-year-
olds and those 22 and older, and between the 18-21-year-
olds and those 26 and older. The absence of any interaction 
effect between age and sex indicates that this pattern was the 
same for males and females.  
 Perhaps the most important conclusion drawn by Stein-
berg et al. (2009) for the assessment of maturity in a legal 
context is that it would be imprudent “to make sweeping 
statements about the relative maturity of adolescents and 
adults, because the answer to the question of whether adoles-
cents are as mature as adults depends on the aspects of ma-
turity under consideration” (p.592). Their findings were con-
sistent with the other studies reviewed in this paper: Al-
though it is not (typically) possible to distinguish between 
adolescents and adults in terms of general cognitive abilities 
after the age of 16, even at the age of 18, adolescent psycho-
social functioning is significantly less mature than that of 
individuals in their mid-20s. However, given the importance 
of (a) context and (b) the nature of the decision that may 
need to made, Steinberg and his colleagues also recommend 
that the age boundary between adolescence and adulthood be 
at different chronological ages for different purposes. Based 
on their extensive body of work, they make a distinction 
between two quite different decision-making contexts: one 
which allows for unhurried, logical reflection and one that 
does not. In other words, when it is possible for the individ-
ual to engage in deliberative, reasoned decision making, with 
emotional and social influences on judgment minimized or 
mitigated, and where objective information about the costs 
and benefits of alternative courses of action is available, de-
cision making for adolescents over the age of 16 is similar to 
that of an adult. This would seem to fit three domains: medi-
cal decision making (in conjunction with information pro-
vided by health care professionals who can also encourage 
the adolescent to think through any decisions before acting), 
legal decision making (where legal practitioners can play a 
comparable role to that of medical practitioners), and deci-
sions about participating in research studies (where the con-
sultant role is undertaken by researchers who, in turn, are 
guided by ethical standards and review boards). By compari-
son, adolescent decision making (at least until 18 years of 
age) is much less likely to reflect that of an adult in situa-
tions that may elicit impulsivity, involve high levels of emo-
tional arousal or social coercion, or fail to encourage or even 
permit consultation with a more knowledgeable expert. Ste-
inberg et al. argue that this latter set of circumstances more 
closely resembles those in which most adolescents commit 
crime (i.e., in groups, without premeditation); it is also typi-
cal of the decision making circumstances in situations where 
there appear to be immediate rewards and few obvious or 
immediate costs (e.g., the purchase and use of licit and illicit 
drugs, dangerous driving behaviors, or unprotected sex).  
CONCLUSION 
 A legal standard for juvenile competence - and, more 
importantly, what constitutes competence - is yet to be for-
malized. In some jurisdictions, the courts require that adoles-
cents have the same capacities as an adult (e.g., the ability to 
communicate with counsel, have a rational understanding of 
the processes involved) while others have set a lower thresh-
old for competence, arguing that in a juvenile court, adoles-
cent offenders should be assessed using juvenile norms 
rather than being compared to adult norms (Viljoen & Wil-
grove, 2007). This level of inconsistency underpins claims 
that youth justice is in a state of crisis (Goldson, 2000; Kem-
shell, 2008; Pitts, 2001). However, as Steinberg and his col-
leagues note, science cannot dictate public policy but should 
nonetheless inform it. What sciences shows is that intellec-
tual maturity is reached several years before psychosocial 
maturity. This “conclusion” is not a new one; there exists is a 
substantial body of research conducted over the past five 
decades which provide evidence to support such a claim. 
Moreover, the proposition is so well-established that the US 
Supreme Court accepted the inherent immaturity of adoles-
cents as the basis for mitigating criminal responsibility to the 
extent that it barred capital punishment for crimes committed 
by individuals under the age of 18, irrespective of the hei-
nousness of the crime.  
 Recent changes in many jurisdictions which has resulted 
in the current trend to adultify juvenile offenders and place a 
heavier emphasis on custodial sentences (Jacobs, 2001; 
Muncie, 2008) reinforce the need to develop (a) a more re-
fined definition of maturity or maturity of judgment and (b) 
measures that can assess across all domains of maturity (i.e., 
cognitive and psychosocial). This is not a simple task. As the 
research reviewed herein illustrates, not only do individuals 
develop at different rates, but development is a fluid rather 
than stage-like process. Moreover, an individual who dis-
plays maturity of judgment in one situation may not neces-
sary display the same degree of maturity in another. How 
then does one make an assessment of whether a young per-
son is capable of making a mature judgment and thereby 
conduct assessment of their level of culpability? There is 
now sufficient empirical evidence regarding the importance 
of psychosocial factors to the making of mature judgments. 
That body of research has also used a number of well-known 
measures to assess both cognitive and psychosocial factors 
that, potentially, impact on the extent to which an individual 
can be held criminally responsible for their actions. The next 
step is to use this information to develop evidence-based 
assessment tools capable of distinguishing between the type 
of judgment which preceded the offending behavior and then 
apply the appropriate set of measures to assess the maturity 
of that judgment. Psychology has a great deal to offer in this 
respect. The ability to conduct assessments has been identi-
fied as a core competency of professional psychologists 
(Hunsley & Mash, 2008) and become a unique and defining 
feature of their professional expertise (Krishnamurthy, Van-
deCreek, Kaslow, Tazeu, Miville, Kerns, et al., 2004). A 
change in the way in which psychological maturity is as-
sessed could begin with psychologists taken a broader ap-
proach in their assessment. 
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